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FERC/PoLB Draft Environmental Impact Document Released On Proposed LB LNG Facility
(Oct. 8, 2005) -- A draft Environmental Impact document, jointly prepared by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and Port of Long Beach (PoLB) staff, says those staffs will recommend to their respective commissions that an 80+ million gallon Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) facility proposed to be built and operated in the Port by Mitsubishi-Conoco via subsidiary Sound Energy Solution (SES) is the environmentally preferable/superior alternative that can meet the project objectives.
On October 7, FERC posted its "Environmental Impact Statement" (EIS) for the proposed LNG project on its website. On October 7, the Port of LB is expected to release its companion "Environmental Impact Report" (EIR) (likely also on its website). Both agencies are required to take public comment on the documents before voting on whether to certify their findings.
To view the document as posted on the FERC website, click here.
The draft EIS/EIR says "none of the potential LNG release scenarios would result in a substantial increase in the potential for incidents that would cause serious injury or death to members of the public." It says SES "has committed to funding all necessary security/emergency management equipment and personnel costs that would be imposed on state and local agencies as a result of the project" and "Overall, construction and operation of the proposed project would not result in an increase in the short- or long-term demand for public services in excess of existing and projected capabilities."
It notes that SES estimates peak construction workforce will be about 404 workers during months 32 and 33 of the total 48-month construction period.
And in a crucial assumption affecting multiple figures in the document, the EIR/EIS applies a mathematical standard that the CA Energy Commission recommended not be used out of concern that it doesn't adequately protect the public.
In a Safety Advisory Report filed with FERC in early September, the CA Energy Commission wrote in part:
The state is concerned that the commonly used 5 KW/m2 thermal radiation flux criterion does not adequately protect the public. Instead, the FERC should model the distance to the "no observable adverse affect level," considering both the worst-case intensity and duration of exposure, and the sensitivity of different populations that would be potentially exposed to an LNG fire at the Port of Long Beach. This is the approach that California uses in the licensing of power plants. At a minimum, the FERC should use a 1.5 kW/m2 thermal radiation flux level, in addition to any additional thermal radiation flux levels that would identify effects and response times to individuals located closer to heat radiated from an LNG fire. The FERC should also analyze the distance at which thermal radiation would impair self rescue and require specially trained personnel and special emergency response equipment.
At issue are the real world effects of radiant heat created by an LNG fire, so hot that at 1,600 Btu/hr-ft2, 5 kW/m2 evident at a certain distance from the fire, in roughly 30-40 seconds it can produce second degree burns on a person's exposed skin outdoors. FERC/PoLB appear to base their EIS/EIR calculations on this level, a figure adopted by the "National Fire Protection Association" (Rule 59A) and referenced in U.S. Dept. of Transportation rules. On that basis, the EIS/EIR concludes that "none of the events considered possible according to [L.A. County Fire Dept.] criteria have the potential to produce radiant impacts that could affect the public outside of the industrial area defined by the POLB boundary line. This is true whether the initiating event is accidental or intentional."
[Comment: LBReport.com presumes the CA Energy Commission's recommended standard, 1.5 kW/m2, would indicate observable effects extend to greater distances than the EIS/EIR's 5 kW/m2.]
The EIS/EIR notes that the CA Energy Commission submitted the Safety Advisory Report to FERC but doesn't acknowledge or quote the CA Energy Commission's recommendation to apply a more protective radiant heat standard (or discuss any other issue in the Safety Advisory Report). "At the time of the printing of this draft EIS/EIR, the report is under review. After completing its review, the FERC will respond specifically to the issues raised by the CEC [CA Energy Commission]" the FERC/PoLB EIS/EIR says.
As previously reported by LBReport.com, use of a 1.5 kW/m2 standard (recommended by CA Energy Commission) is also backed by Dr. Jerry Havens, an expert retained by the CA Public Utilities Commission (CPUC). On October 4, CPUC filed a motion with FERC citing Dr. Havens' views and publicly opposing the LNG facility in the Port. Our coverage included comments from an attorney representing SES on environmental and permitting issues, who indicated the company is concerned about and investigating the validity of the model used by Dr. Havens and is trying to validate it out of concern on its part that there might be flaws in his modeling.
Visual simultation of proposed LNG project from Queensway Bridge included in EIS/EIR, p. 4-62. Entrance to Gerald Desmond bridge visible at right, cranes at former Naval Station at left. Not shown one of up to 120 LNG tankers per year (roughly one every three days): length 844-1,115 feet, typically 950-1,000 feet, width about 150 feet. Capacity 75,000-208,000 cubic meters, typically between 125,000-165,000 cubic meters. Text source: EIR/EIS, p. 2-5.
The EIS/EIR includes a PoLB-commissioned Hazards Analysis of "worst case" scenarios (required under a CA law) prepared by Quest Consultants, Inc. of Norman, Oklahoma. Portions of the analysis were censored. FERC labelled as "Critical Energy Infrastructure Information" some material related to [category titles as cited in public report] Terrorist-Hijacked Airplane Crashing Into One or Both LNG Tanks, Release From an LNG Storage Tank Following the Impact of a Rocket-propelled Grenade, Release From an LNG Tank Ship Following a Boat Bomb.
"All supporting calculations, documentation, and references in regard to calculating the size and location of potential release area(s) for this scenario have been removed due to FERC CEII concerns," the report says.
Quest's Hazards Analysis offers a table juxtaposing individual risks of early fatality (Nat'l Safety Council, 1997) (heart disease: 1 chance in 360; cancer: 1 chance in 495; all accidents: 1 chance in 2,840) with Quest's calculation of "Accidental Release of LNG from proposed LNG terminal, which produces second degree burns outside of POLB boundary" (1 in 10 ten million) and "Intentional [terrorist] release of LNG from proposed LNG terminal, which produces second degree burns outside of POLB boundary." (1 in 69.6 million).
Quest concludes -- also using the FERC/PoLB standard, not the more protective CA Energy Commission-advised standard -- that "only two of the events evaluated have the potential to produce radiant impacts [2d degree burns] past the industrial area defined by the POLB boundary line." One is an earthquake "of the magnitude necessary to fail the full containment LNG storage tank which "would be more than sufficient to level every structure in the Port of Long Beach as well as the City of Long Beach" plus "a high wind...blowing in order for the fire to impact any area outside the POLB boundary." The other is a fire following a truck bomb that fails one of the LNG storage tanks as well as the security wall would result "in a fire similar to, but smaller than, the fire associated with the earthquake...since the LNG inventory is less (only one tank fails)."
Quest concludes, "All the remaining LNG fire events evaluated for this study (those associated with terminal operations, storage,and LNG tank ship movements and operations) have no fire radiation impacts (second degree skin burns) that extend past the POLB boundary. This is true whether the initiating event is accidental or intentional."
FERC/PoLB staff authored the following "Conclusions On Safety Issues":
Much of the recent safety debate has centered on the perceived size of worst-case scenarios, the distance to various thermal radiation heat levels for LNG fires, the range of potentially flammable vapors, and the population and infrastructure that are located within the various hazard areas. These are components of a consequence analysis.
However, the evaluation of safety is more than an exercise in calculating the consequences of worst-case scenarios. Rather, safety is a determination of the acceptability of risk that considers the probability of events, the effect of mitigation, and the consequences of events.
The analysis in the previous sections has shown that based on the extensive operational
experience of LNG shipping, the structural design of an LNG vessel, and the operational controls imposed by the ship’s master, the Coast Guard, and local pilots, the likelihood of a cargo containment failure and subsequent LNG spill from a vessel casualty -- collision, grounding, or allision -- is very small.
For similar reasons, an accident involving the onshore LNG import terminal or LNG trucking from the terminal is unlikely to affect the public. As a result, the risk to the public from accidental causes should be considered negligible.
Unlike accidental causes, historical experience provides little guidance in estimating the
probability of a terrorist attack on an LNG vessel or onshore storage facility. For a new LNG import terminal proposal that would store a large volume of flammable fluid near populated areas, the perceived threat of a terrorist attack is a primary concern of the local population.
However, at the national level, potential terrorist targets are plentiful, including those having national significance, those with a large concentration of the public (e.g., major sporting events, mass transit, skyscrapers, etc.), or critical infrastructure facilities. Currently, the United States has over 500 chemical facilities operating near large populations. U.S. waterways also transport over 100,000 annual shipments of hazardous marine cargo, including LPG, ammonia, and other volatile chemicals. Many of these substances pose similar hazards to those of LNG. The POLB Quest Study reported that the historical probability of a successful terrorist event would be less than seven chances in a million per year.
In addition, the multi-tiered security system that would be in place for an LNG import facility in the POLB would reduce the probability of a successful terrorist event.
While the risks associated with the transportation of any hazardous cargo can never be entirely eliminated, they can be managed. For potential targets where the threat is perceived to be high, resources can be directed to mitigate possible attack paths. Such efforts may deter potential attacks on one target, but shift efforts to those that are less protected. As a result, the issue is how to best direct finite resources.
For the proposed project, it may be possible to apply risk management resources to manage
realistic threats; however, an even greater level of resources may be required to manage the threats as perceived at the local level. The issue for the decision makers is whether the resources required to manage the risks are justified by the benefits, while recognizing that the risks cannot be entirely eliminated.
The analysis concludes that none of the potential LNG release scenarios would result in a
substantial increase in the potential for incidents that would cause serious injury or death to members of the public. SES’ commitment to coordinate with local emergency providers and fund all project-specific security/emergency management costs would ensure that the project would not substantially reduce the level of fire and police services. Therefore, the proposed Long Beach LNG Import Project would not result in a significant impact on public safety.
Additional extended excerpts from the EIS/EIR follow (a link the full document is posted at the end of this article) re the LNG projects impacts stated by FERC/PoLB staff:
Public Services: A wide range of public services and facilities are offered in the Cities of Long Beach and Los Angeles. Services and facilities include full-service law enforcement, paid fire departments, emergency response services, and hospitals. The City of Carson does not have its own fire or police departments; these services are provided by Los Angeles County.
Three public safety agencies provide emergency response service to the City of Long Beach and
the POLB. They include the Long Beach City Fire Department (LBFD), the Long Beach Police
Department (LBPD), and the Coast Guard District 11. The city also has informal mutual aid agreements with the County of Los Angeles and the City of Los Angeles, and can receive assistance under California’s Master Mutual Aid Plan if an emergency incident is beyond the capability of the local resources.
The LBPD has one main police station and three division substations. It employs over 900 sworn officers. The LBFD consists of about 500 personnel, of which 402 are assigned various emergency response duties. The remaining personnel are assigned to support functions. The LBFD would be responsible for an initial public safety response to a product release, fire, or medical emergency at the LNG terminal facility.
The LBFD has a total of 23 fire stations that house 22 engine companies, 4 truck companies, 18 paramedic capable resources (8 of which are transport capable ambulances), 3 airport crash/rescue vehicles, 1 foam apparatus, 6 fire and lifeguard boats, and 4 beach rescue units. In 2002, the LBFD handled a total of 54,436 responses, most of which were medical (35,956) and fire (5,653) related. When last rated by the Insurance Service Organization (ISO), the LBFD earned a Class 1 rating that signifies exemplary fire protection (ISO, 2003).
The City of Long Beach is divided into three geographic areas or districts for the administration of emergency responses. District 1 serves the downtown area and the POLB. District 1 resources include eight fire stations strategically located throughout the POLB and the downtown area with eight fire engines, four paramedic rescue ambulances, two truck companies, two fireboats, and one technical rescue vehicle. Fifty-two personnel staff the District 1 facilities on a daily basis. Fire Station 24, currently located at the LNG terminal site, would be relocated to a new site less than 1 mile away. Three other District 1 fire stations are within 4 miles of the LNG terminal site and another three stations are within 5
miles. Additional nearby resources include the City of Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) Task Force 38, which is within 4 miles of the LNG terminal site and LAFD Task Force 48 and Hazardous Materials Company 48, which are located within 6 miles of the site.
There are three major hospitals in the City of Long Beach: Long Beach Memorial Hospital,
Pacific Hospital of Long Beach, and the St. Mary Medical Center. Long Beach Memorial Hospital is the second largest private hospital on the west coast with 726 beds, 1,200 physicians, and 3,500 employees. The Pacific Hospital of Long Beach is a full service, teaching hospital with 208 beds and over 700 employees. The St. Mary Medical Center has 539 beds, 1,249 employees, and 157 medical staff.
Because the non-local workforce would be small relative to the current population, construction of the project facilities would not impact the local community facilities and services such as police, fire, and medical services. The City of Long Beach has adequate infrastructure and community services to meet the needs of the non-local workers that would be required for the project. Other construction-related demands on local agencies could include increased enforcement activities associated with issuing permits for vehicle load and width limits, local police assistance during construction at road crossings to facilitate
traffic flow, and emergency medical services to treat injuries resulting from construction accidents.
LNG would be a new product to the POLB; therefore, it also would be new to the local fire and emergency response services. Although the LBFD has experience responding to and effectively handling emergency incidents involving bulk petroleum facilities and transport ship-related incidents at the POLB, specialized training may be necessary for local fire services to properly understand the risks associated with LNG. The National Association of State Fire Marshals (NASFM), the OPS, and the OEP are developing an LNG safety training module that will be added to the existing firefighter safety program material. The intention is to educate and train the local fire services in the risks associated with LNG so that they will be positioned to take a leadership role in further educating emergency first responders in the
communities they serve.
SES is working with local emergency providers to develop procedures to handle potential fire emergencies at the LNG terminal site and on LNG ships. The procedures would be included in an Emergency Response Plan for the facility. Additional information on emergency response procedures is provided in section 4.11.9. SES assisted the Fire Prevention Bureau of the LBFD with the selection of a third-party consultant to help the department conduct technical reviews of the facility’s procedures and has also offered to provide funding for a plan check/inspection position within the Fire Prevention Bureau. In addition, SES is working with the LBFD to provide hazard control and firefighting training that is specific to LNG and LNG vessels. SES would fund a live-fire training session and demonstration for LBFD personnel at the proposed terminal site. SES has also offered to sponsor and conduct a familiarization tour of an LNG facility similar to the proposed project. In addition, SES has committed to
funding all necessary security/emergency management equipment and personnel costs that would be imposed on state and local agencies as a result of the project and would prepare a comprehensive plan that identifies the mechanisms for funding these costs. To allow the FERC and the POLB the opportunity to review the plan, the Agency Staffs will recommend to their respective Commissions that SES file its comprehensive plan identifying the mechanisms for funding all project-specific security/emergency management costs that would be imposed on state and local agencies concurrent with its submission of the Follow-on WSA to the FERC staff (see section 188.8.131.52). The LBFD’s experience, extensive and comprehensive training in petroleum and shipboard firefighting, in addition to the training specific to LNG that would be provided by SES and SES’ commitment to fund emergency management equipment and personnel costs should adequately equip the LBFD to handle any type of emergency at the proposed
LNG terminal facility.
Overall, construction and operation of the proposed project would not result in an increase in the short- or long-term demand for public services in excess of existing and projected capabilities.
Economy & Employment: : ...SES estimates that the peak construction workforce would be about 404 workers during months 32 and 33 of the total 48-month construction period (see section 4.6.3). The majority of the construction workforce would be available within the Los Angeles and Orange County labor pool; however, some specialized LNG construction personnel may need to be obtained from outside the local labor pool.
Property Values: The LNG terminal facilities associated with the Long Beach LNG Import Project would be located within an industrial area under the jurisdiction of the POLB. The natural gas and C2 pipelines would also be located in areas designated for industrial use. The nearest potential residences are in a recreational vehicle park about 1.5 miles east-northeast of the LNG terminal site and possibly live-aboard boats at two marinas in the East Basin of the Cerritos Channel between 1.2 and 1.6 miles northwest of the LNG terminal. As a result, the project would not have an adverse impact on property values. As discussed in section 184.108.40.206, the pipelines would cross two privately owned parcels within the POLB and others outside of the POLB. No impacts on the property values for these parcels are anticipated because they already contain industrial facilities or are located in areas designated for industrial use.
Tax Revenues: Construction and operation of the Long Beach LNG Import Project would have a beneficial impact on local tax revenue. Revenue from sales tax would be greater during construction based on the temporary influx of workers to the area. The project would generate a construction payroll of about $100.6 million over the 48-month construction period.
During operation of the project, the payroll would be about $3.7 million annually for the 60 full-time employees. The project would generate an estimated $9.2 million in state, county, and local taxes per year. The $9.2 million is based on an estimated $6.6 million in income taxes (includes the 60 full-time employees as well as workers employed by others to support the project operations and income taxes on the product throughput), $2.2 million in property taxes, and $400,000 in sales taxes. Of the $9.2 million in tax revenues, about $3.8 million would be paid to the City of Long Beach, $2.1 million would be paid to local schools, $1.5 million would be paid to the County of Los Angeles, $920,000 would be paid to the State of California, and $900,000 would be paid to a special district. This increase in tax
revenue would be permanent.
Effects of an Economic Disruption at the Port: ...Comments were also received about the potential economic impact of a closure of the POLB due to disruption of the LNG terminal by either natural disaster or terrorism. A discussion of hazards that would result from an accidental or intentional (e.g., terrorist-induced) release of LNG or other hydrocarbons in or near SES’ proposed LNG import terminal is presented in section 4.11 and Appendix
F [Quest Analysis]. The economic effects of a closure of the POLB due to a disruption of the LNG terminal cannot realistically be analyzed quantitatively. In general, however, the extent of impacts associated with a closure of the POLB would be a function of the duration of the closure and the capacity of other ports along the west coast to compensate for the closure. In September 2001, ports along the west coast closed due to a labor lockout. This event provides insight into the possible economic effects associated with a closure of the POLB. Initial estimates during the west coast labor lockout were that the nation was losing $1 billion a day; however, most industry observers thought that the relatively short duration of the lockout (10 days) resulted in a much lower impact (i.e., around several hundred million dollars a day at most).
Most of the economic impacts associated with the west coast lockout were in the form of
increased inventory carrying costs by shippers who were delayed in receiving their cargo, product spoilage, and lost salaries for the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) (although overtime paid later probably offset this loss). It should be emphasized, however, that the lockout extended to the entire west coast and opportunities for diversion of discretionary cargo were relatively constrained (all-water through the Panama or Suez Canals). For a scenario in which a closure would only affect the POLB, there would be many more opportunities to divert non-local cargo. For example, the ports of Seattle/Tacoma and Oakland could handle much of the diverted cargo during the short term. In addition, if the POLA were still operating, it could increase local cargo handling during a closure of the POLB. The likely scenario associated with a closure of the POLB would be that many transpacific
services would adjust their rotation and call at Seattle/Tacoma or Oakland first to discharge the intermodal cargo and then call at the POLA to deliver primarily local cargo. Although there would be some delays, the west coast port system could handle a short-term closure of the POLB. According to the POLB, the Port would have to be closed for an extended period of time before significant economic impacts would occur.
Environmental Justice: [Cumulative impacts] -- Although the City of Long Beach could be characterized as poorer than average and has an over 50 percent minority population, there is no evidence that the project would result in cumulative impacts on any racial, ethnic, or socioeconomic group because the facilities would be located primarily within an existing industrial area associated with the POLB. In addition, all of the projects identified in table 4.12-1 would be consistent with the land use polices and designations of the Cities of Long Beach and Los Angeles and their respective ports as well as with the past development of
Security: ...Safety and security are important considerations in any action undertaken by the FERC and the POLB. The attacks of September 11, 2001 have changed the way LNG terminal operators as well as regulators must consider terrorism, both in approving new projects and in operating existing facilities.
However, the likelihood of future acts of terrorism or sabotage occurring at the proposed LNG import terminal, or at any of the myriad natural gas pipeline or energy facilities throughout the United States is unpredictable given the disparate motives and abilities of terrorist groups. The continuing need to construct facilities to support the future natural gas pipeline infrastructure is not diminished by the threat of any such unpredictable acts...
...The POLB Quest Study evaluated the extent of fire radiation and explosion overpressure hazards for a range of worst-case releases that included both accidental and intentional releases of flammable fluid from SES’ proposed LNG terminal and LNG ship operations in the POLB. The hazards associated with the proposed LNG import terminal and LNG ship operations are common to most flammable fuel facilities worldwide.
The historical record shows that successful intentional releases of flammable fuel from events at facilities in the United States have not occurred. This finding is supported by federal reports addressing this topic that were written after the terrorist events of September 11, 2001. The federal reports do not identify flammable fuel facilities as those that could affect large numbers of the public (Belke, 2000; U.S. Army, 2001; Brookings Institution, 2002; U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003).
A full range of accidental and intentional releases of LNG, natural gas, and other flammable fluids was evaluated. The accidental releases covered a range of events that could occur at an LNG terminal. The intentional releases covered a range of possible terrorist-induced releases ranging from localized damage to equipment as a result of a small explosive charge to more sophisticated and logistically challenging operations involving hijacked aircraft or ships.
The evaluation of the accidental and intentional release scenarios found that the most likely hazard to result from any of the releases is exposure to radiant heat from a pool fire or torch fire. The potential for any of the releases to produce damaging overpressures was found to be small and localized.
The potential for drifting flammable vapor clouds to travel a significant distance before being ignited was small, with the possible exception of those releases that may occur outside of the Long Beach Harbor breakwater.
POLB Seismic Design Criteria:: ...The POLB asked SES to estimate how large an earthquake would be needed to cause the LNG storage tanks to fail. Analyses by ARUP (2005) and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (2005) estimated that an earthquake of M9.0 on the Palos Verde fault or M7.5 on the THUMS-HB fault would be necessary to generate ground motions strong enough to rupture the tanks and release their contents. These events have estimated return intervals of approximately 15,000 years and, therefore, are extremely unlikely to occur during the 50-year life of the project...
Quest Hazards Analysis conclusion:...In conclusion, the results of this study can be summarized by the following points.
- The historical record and the Federal government’s evaluation of flammable fuel facilities does not support the contention that the proposed LNG terminal would make an attractive terrorist target.
- If a successful terrorist-induced event occurred tomorrow in any toxic chemical or flammable fuels facility in the United States that could impact as many or more people than the proposed LNG import terminal in the POLB, the historical frequency would then be approximately 7.15 x (10) -6 /yr.
- The fire radiation hazards from LNG pool fires are the most likely hazards to occur, and they produce the largest hazard zones should they occur. Significant overpressures covering a large area are not possible and the opportunity for drifting flammable vapor clouds to travel any significant distance over land before igniting is not credible.
- None of the accidental or intentional releases from the LNG terminal or LNG tank ship operations have the ability to produce radiant levels (10,000 Btu/(hr @ft 2 )) capable of damaging industrial equipment outside the POLB boundary.
- Only one accidental release (that caused by an earthquake of sufficient magnitude to fail the LNG tanks) can produce a radiant hazard (1,600 Btu/(hr @ft 2 ); second degree skin burns) to persons outside of the POLB boundary. It should be recognized that an earthquake of this magnitude would, on its own, cause wide-spread destruction in the POLB and Long Beach.
- Only one intentional release, the effective placement of a truck bomb beside one of the LNG storage tanks, can produce a radiant hazard (1,600 Btu/(hr @ft 2 ); second degree skin burns) to persons outside of the POLB boundary, and only under specific atmospheric conditions.
Under federal and state laws, the documents are now subject to "public comment." (As previously indicated, PoLB and FERC staff have already indicated that they will recommend to their respective Commissions that SES’ proposed project is the environmentally preferable/superior alternative that can meet the project objectives.)
Procedures -- including deadlines -- for submitting written comments are described in detail in materials on the FERC website (below) and will probably be duplicated on PoLB's website.
In lieu of or in addition to submitting written comments, a joint public comment meeting will be conducted by Agency Staffs on November 14, 2005 at 6 p.m. in the LB City Council Chambers.
In addition, in "accordance with the POLB’s new protocols for preparing environmental documents, the POLB will hold three additional public comment meetings for interested groups and individuals to attend and present oral comments on the draft EIS/EIR and/or draft PMP [Port Master Plan] Amendment No. 20 [to be submitted to CA Coastal Comm'n]. Transcripts of these meetings will be prepared. The additional meetings are scheduled as follows:
- Tuesday, November 15, 2005, 6:00 PM (PST) David Starr Jordan High School
6550 Atlantic Avenue
Long Beach, CA 90805
- Wednesday, November 30, 2005, 6:00 PM (PST) Robert A. Millikan High School
2800 Snowden Avenue
Long Beach, CA 90815
- Thursday, December 1, 2005, 6:00 PM (PST) Juan Rodriguez Cabrillo High School
2001 Santa Fe Avenue
Long Beach, CA 90810
"After the comments from the meetings are reviewed, any significant new issues are investigated, and modifications are made to the draft EIS/EIR and draft General Conformity Determination, a final EIS/EIR, including a final General Conformity Determination, will be published and distributed by the Agency Staffs. The final EIS/EIR will contain the Agency Staffs’ responses to timely comments received..."
After FERC and PoLB staffs give their answers to public comments, the agencies' non-elected governing bodies will vote on whether to certify the Environmental documents.
To view the EIS/EIR as posted on the FERC website, click here.
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